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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 34/82)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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### CONTENTS

#### TERRORISM

##### ITALY

- Revelations by BR Leader Enrico Fenzi  
(Enrico Fenzi Interview; EUROPEO, 19 Apr 82) ..... 1

#### ECONOMIC

##### FRANCE

- Economic Poll Shows Socialist 'Discouragement'; Gattaz Reacts  
(VALEURS ACTUELLES, 12-18 Apr 82) ..... 11

Poll Results, by Philippe Durupt  
Gattaz Expresses Worry, Yvon Gattaz Interview

- Mauroy Issues Letter on 1983 Budget: Employment Main Goal  
(VALEURS ACTUELLES, 22-28 Mar 82) ..... 20

- CNPF Stresses Basic, Industrial Research, Innovation  
(LA RECHERCHE, Mar 82) ..... 22

##### SPAIN

- Continuing High Unemployment May Radicalize PSOE, PCE  
(CAMBIO 16, 12 Apr 82) ..... 24

#### POLITICAL

##### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Labor Leader Attacks Schmidt's Policies  
(Leonhard Mahlein; STERN, 22 Apr 82) ..... 28

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

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ITALY

Survey of Public Opinion on Possible Early Elections (Donato Speroni; IL MONDO, 9 Apr 82) .....	30
USSR Seen Trying To Regain PCI 'Solidarity' (Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 16 May 82) .....	42

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Briefs New Military Intelligence Chief	45
---	----

FRANCE

Maintaining SNLE's Part of Peacetime Navy Mission (Alain Duthoit; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Apr 82) .....	46
--	----

- b -

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TERRORISM

ITALY

REVELATIONS BY BR LEADER ENRICO FENZI

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 19 Apr 82 pp 6-11

[Interview with Enrico Fenzi, Red Brigade leader, by Marcella Andreoli; date and place not specified]

[Text] The terror is over--I'll tell you why. "The armed struggle has lost." The errors, the fanaticism, the madness of the Red Brigades denounced by Enrico Fenzi, protagonist of our "years of the bullet."

Enrico Fenzi, 45 years old, father of four children, professor of Italian literature at the University of Genoa, was one of the leaders, one of the "professors" of the Red Brigades. Arrested the first time in the spring of 1979 by General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, he was acquitted by the court: it maintained that the charges were unfounded. But in April 1981, after repentant terrorists from Genoa had explained his role inside the Red Brigades, Enrico Fenzi was caught redhanded: he was in the company of Mario Moretti, BR [Red Brigade] leader in Milan.

Brother-in-law of Giovanni Senzani, the recently arrested Red Brigades criminologist, separated husband of Maria Grazia Chelli who was arrested 15 days ago by the Digos for armed organization, and romantically involved with Isabella Ravazzi, a young researcher for the National Research Council who was arrested and later acquitted of charges of participation in the Red Brigades, Enrico Fenzi has decided to disassociate himself from the armed struggle.

In this interview with L'EUROPEO, he has agreed to explain the reason for his choice. It is a long, often original and always lively reflection on the tragic error of armed struggle, the failure of the Dozier kidnapping, the inexorable decline of the Red Brigades.

Question: Why have you, too, decided to disassociate yourself from the armed struggle?

Answer: All the other questions are in that one. I should tell all that I think about the Red Brigades, about armed struggle in Italy.... Well, my separation from the Red Brigades began after the arrest (the second one, in

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Milan with Moretti); its immediate origin was the question of defense: I intended to defend myself in court, refusing the so-called guerrilla-trial. This immediately put me out of the Red Brigades line and brought about my suspension.

I think this subject (the attitudes in court and everything concerning them) is very important, and that what has been written about it has been hurried and imprecise. It should be discussed better: but I won't do that, because in my case, the problem was hidden inside another more important one: the very participation in the political plan of the Red Brigades and my basic convictions.

As soon as I emerged from isolation following my arrest in June 1981, I immediately learned from the other prisoners that the Red Brigades were splitting apart, and that a terrible internal struggle had broken out. Contradictory messages continued to arrive from the outside that urged us to line up on one side or another, but it was really difficult to understand what was going on. There is more: it was obvious that there were great differences because of the very manner of the four kidnappings then in course: Cirillo, Sandrucci, Taliercio, Peci. And some of these (Peci and Taliercio in particular) caused a reaction of political and moral rejection that ended up involving the entire practice of the Red Brigades.

The summer passed, marked by messages saying that the divisions were growing irreparably deeper, and that the problems posed by these four kidnappings were blowing up, almost by their own momentum, with no one able to do anything about it. My state of "suspension" permitted me to have summary information, but at the same time left me out of the fray, free to reflect completely alone. Finally, the arrest of Senzani and his group, the Prison Front, and the failure of the Dozier kidnapping, with the chain of other arrests, repentances and disassociations were the last, probably decisive blows to an already crumbling edifice that was full of cracks from top to bottom.

Question: But that still does not explain your disassociation.

Answer: True, even if it was a period full of dramatic moments. I think it was the result of more general considerations and of personal and moral reactions which, for the moment, I would like to leave out. As I have already said, I am convinced that armed struggle has demonstrated itself to be incapable of giving a political program, and that this, despite efforts made particularly by the Red Brigades, is the principle cause of the downfall.

The explanation should be very long, but I will try to summarize it. Armed struggle, given conditions in Italy, ruins any possibilities for developing a political project because it rapidly consumes its social roots, repudiates the workers' struggle, and precipitates into a pure and absurd logic of war.

Question: Can you explain what you mean with some examples?

Answer: I think a star example is the destiny of the so-called activists of the Prison Front and Naples, who started out with great social ambitions and

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with a good dose of demagoguery too, but ended up more militaristic than the others. Aside from theoretical contrapositions, the margins for political differences are annulled inside the armed group, and all that is left is a strange war, impossible to win in which almost nobody believes, and with respect to which there is neither adequate strength nor strategy. And finally, there is not even a "why," given that the why of every war rests in the close and concrete prospect of victory, in a time commensurate with action and personal commitment, and not to the undefined time of a generic transition to communism.

Destroying is not enough

At this point we come across one of the greatest contradictions of the Brigade theorization. On one hand, to justify armed struggle and the type of organization that must direct it, one must naturally maintain that by now, the capitalistic crisis has come to the point to which any social route is closed, and that only a war relationship remains. (All struggles, such as those of the unions, and, in the broad sense, social struggles, are therefore declared passe, useless). On the other hand, given that such a crude and antihistorical schematization is totally abstract and concretely inapplicable, they also invent the theory of "long-term struggle," that is, an almost philosophical concept of war as a permanent condition of social development; in this concept, the notion of victory vanishes and is lost in the idea of historical progress in the universal category of "transition."

Question: Do these motives explain so much disassociation from terrorism?

Answer: Yes. I believe that this discussion, which I probably do not know how to carry out very well, is not as abstruse as it seems, but has great political consequences. And then, all one needs to do is read the documents of the Red Brigades. They state with ever increasing insistence that the objective of the war, the armed struggle, is not a, how can you say it, a normal objective. Not a struggle for houses, salaries, services, not even for the collapse of the government, a policy of alliances, the formation of a new social block, a series of interventions in productive sectors, the reform of structures...nothing like that! And yet even the guerrillas of El Salvador have their representatives in Washington, and they are extremely flexible on the political plane! Instead, the objective of the Red Brigades is the destruction of the "way of capitalistic production," maintained possible because the difficulties of this way of production would have already brought it to a convulsive agony.

What does not function in this simplistic reasoning is that the "way of production" is not reducible to the lowest common denominator of a formula that explains everything, and when cancelled with a brushstroke will cause the whole world to change suddenly. And I do not think that men have ever, repeat, ever struggled directly against a "way of production"; I believe, rather, that they have always struggled and worked to have more food, more life, more wealth, more liberty for themselves and their children.

One does not go out in the morning with a pistol in his pocket to combat a historic category that summarizes the entire set of relationships between men

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and between men and nature in its historic development and in enormously rich and complex ways. One does not move alone, externally, to attack the social universe as if it were a single and compact dead body to burn. This body, instead, has never stopped living and changing, it is also our collective body, its historical reality, its needs.

Question: And yet, the Red Brigades maintain that the capitalistic crisis is grave....

Answer: Yes, and that the devastation that it generates is even graver. Yet this does not happen because the formula of the law of value contains in itself a type of mathematical paradox that confuses the calculations of the capitalists, but rather, because the dynamic between classes is something alive, in continuous motion: it is inside the social universe, in the forces that move it, and in the concrete struggles passing through it, that the "way of production" is contorted in its crises, but also denies itself, mutates, alters its primitive features.

To deny all that, and fossilize reality into a huge dead and hostile body means not only the denial of history, but also the murder of politics, the condemnation of oneself to defeat, the growth of desperation.

Question: But the entire theory of the Red Brigades rests on the postulate that the passing of the way of capitalistic production to that which will succeed it must come about through an instant and traumatic break.

Answer: Yes, they state it clearly in the document "Subjectivism and Militarism." That passage, they affirm, must come about precisely through armed struggle because the two "ways" have nothing in common, one is the negation of the other. Different from what came about in the passage from feudalism to capitalism, two "-isms" that struggled and lived in strict symbiosis for centuries, there would not be interaction and passage between capitalism and communism. Thus, after one contradicts more or less the entire history of the Twentieth Century, he can avoid explaining what the future "way" will be, given that in the blocked and a historical present of capitalism, it is precisely this "way" that does not exist and about which one cannot really say anything. That is why the practicing spirit of the Red Brigades is the "theory of collapse," which becomes the irrational hope for total upheaval, if not exactly the wait for the third world war.

And then, only this type of faith can make the risks of the armed struggle bearable, certainly not the acceptance of history's long terms. One can say, therefore, that historical dynamics become pushed to one side, away from reality, and that the brigade member constructs his own world, accelerated by more or less imaginary phases and categories that would justify what he is doing, and in sight of which he defines the "epocal leap."

I remember very well the explanations that were given in the autumn of 1980 for the fact that almost all those arrested in Genoa collaborated with the investigators in various ways: they did not understand that they were not fighting for the immediate, but that they were part of a program of history.



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Question: In short, armed struggle is waged because the collapse of capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat is just around the corner?

Answer: Certainly, and the only conceivable social activity would be war. But every time one realizes that things are more complex and perhaps different, one also discovers that the struggle is "long term," and this is a "transition" phase. In short, tomorrow, the most abstract schematization and social dialectic, the needs, experiences and the history of people will all disappear. That is why the ever more frequent arrests put everything into question: they are a sort of forced return to reality, the general reality of social relationships, and naturally, one's personal reality.

Question: But isn't there, more simply, some calculating: the least amount of time in prison, the better?

Answer: Yes, certainly, but this one element does not have much significance by itself. This increased desire to get out of prison is determined by many specific causes. In persons who are extremely ideologized, the collapse of their convictions and programs assumes a fundamental value. Their very defeat becomes the sign of a more general crisis that involves the relationship between means and ends, and therefore renders senseless what they were doing before.

When they got Moretti

This is not all reducible to pure and simple regurgitation of bourgeois "individualism": that is an explanation that explains nothing politically. What happens is that the captured brigade member undertakes a sort of really terrible double mortal leap. First of all, his capture puts him face to face with reality as it is and destroys his plans. But at the same time, incarceration denies him that newly found reality and again makes it unreachable.

Question: With what consequences?

Answer: Many. For example, the impact with the microcosm of prison masks many illusions that also concern the internal dynamics of his group and the fire and asphyxiating incarceration in a dimension in which nothing of one's political and human ideals is found. And the weakness of many recruits must also be taken into consideration, for it reflects the political crisis of armed struggle. Metropolitan disintegration causes those individuals who make the great leap to armed struggle to have extremely different and often vague reasons for doing so. Desperation suggests that there is no social relationship other than that expressed through armed struggle, and the person who does not accept standing on the sidelines and who wants to be somebody is pushed to make that leap by a form of often very strong psychological blackmail. Yet it is also because of this that now many of those who have made that leap, once they are captured, seem to have awakened from a nightmare, and liberate themselves through the confession of blackmail denuded in its elementary but efficient mechanism.

Question: Do you think that the Red Brigades are through? That their political plan is finished?

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Answer: You have to make a distinction. I think that the Red Brigades, as they have existed up to now, are finished. Yet the principle reason for their weakness, that is, the lack of a political plan, can, on a different level, become a reason for their survival.

Aside from the obvious consideration that the causes producing the social phenomenon of armed struggle are still present, I would say that the awareness, even if confused, that the world risks precipitating into the catastrophe of nuclear war, and that the crisis of the economic capitalistic system is deep, provokes a natural and unsuppressible push towards anything that appears to be an acceleration of the course of history, towards something that can make us take that great leap over the abyss, taking us to safety on the other side.

A philosophy that wagers on that leap can always be successful, no matter what the criticism is about returning to the present and to the realism of politics. Except that you're not talking about a political project, if anything, you're talking about the contrary.

Question: That is...?

Answer: One recent Red Brigade document speaks of the "death of politics": a death caused, let this be clear, by the armed struggle for the "epocal leap." This is a difficult, even desperate hope, but can one live without hope? The question that comes out in every discussion criticizing armed struggle is, "But then, what else?" When the letter of Bonavita (editor's note: he is one of the original leaders, now repentant) was discussed in prison, the same phrase always returned: "OK, but what does he propose?" It is true then, that a chapter is finished and that these Red Brigades have been defeated, but as long as someone asks that question and does not get an answer, the armed struggle will keep its power of attraction, even if it is only as sort of a moral model for those who will not carry it out personally.

Question: What judgment do you make concerning Giovanni Senzani, your brother-in-law, who was violently attacked in the Red Brigades?

Answer: I do not want to make personal judgments about anybody. As far as the criticism is concerned, it is not tied so much to the person of Senzani as it is to the affair which brought about the splitting up of the Red Brigades. There are people who attack Senzani and people who attack with equal harshness Senzani's attackers...it depends on what side one is on, so the discussion cannot be limited to him.

Question: And a judgment on Mario Moretti?

Answer: Again, no personal judgments. Yet I can add that Moretti has been attacked many times, but that because of his experience and maturity he has always represented a higher reference point, above the factions somehow.

Question: But then what did the arrest of Moretti represent to the Red Brigades?

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Answer: It represented a lot, certainly. But one cannot say that what happened later was the result of his arrest, no matter how important it was. In 1978-79, with Moretti free and active, an extremely harsh political clash took place between the so-called "historical group" in jail and the Red Brigades, and this clash was a determining influence on the history of successive breaks inside the organization. Then a complete break was made in 1980 with the Walter Alasia column in Milan. Finally, the Genoese column collapsed, revealing an extremely deep political crisis, not analyzed or understood then.

In short, what happened after Moretti's arrest was only the evolution of what existed before, which neither he nor the others could prevent. To attribute the defeat of the Red Brigades to the absence of Moretti is as puerile, I think, as attributing it to the single "infamy" of a series of arrests.

Question: What is the difference between movementists and militarists in the Red Brigades?

Answer: A movementist is defined as one who interprets the armed struggle as a natural, spontaneous phenomenon that flowers inside the class struggle and always remains an intimate and faithful expression of it, directly connected to the needs and tensions of the masses. A militarist, instead, would be one who considers the armed struggle something artificial and constructed, as a purely political construction that causes a knowledgeable break with the normal forms of the class struggle, and which places itself at the forefront as a model: a model of how one must fight, of how one must be organized, of what must be hit.

Roughly, the movementist sees the organization as a type of people's militia, he accents its informal richness and tries to see that it is continually kept up to date with the contents of the great mass struggles, while the militarists sees the organization as a real army, separate from the civil population, and completely autonomous in the elaboration of its strategies of war: its principle problem with the masses would be, if anything, recruitment.

The Red Brigades have always tried to operate on two levels, working out subtle theories to explain the relationship between equality-difference that runs between the proletariat and its avantguard gathered together in the party-army. Something like what the Church did to explain the mystery of the Trinity, made up of three equal and distinct persons.

#### The Dozier Defeat

Question: And how have the Red Brigades solved the problem?

Answer: Despite all their efforts, they have always been condemned as militarists. The entire history of armed struggle has been guided by this inexorable logic. The impossibility of formulating any project that goes beyond killing, sabotage, generates a contradiction that is reflected inside the organization and that in fact, chooses the military line, exalts the logic of war. And so the ties and reasonings of classes are torn apart.

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Question: What did the defeat of the Dozier case mean to the Red Brigades?

Answer: The Red Brigades obeyed and carried to completion the internal logic of their war with the kidnapping of the American general. They did not make any social demands (for example, that the Cosimo base not be built, or that military spending be reduced) because they did not want and were not able to do so: that was not the intimate nature of their actions, their politics, their general aims. What existed for the Red Brigades was only their army and the enemy army: therefore, one was dealing with only a two-sided challenge made by a purely military party.

I read later that they were going to ask for an exchange: Dozier for a prisoner. I believe that this is possible because it fits in perfectly with military logic, and has always taken place between opposing armies: we exchange our generals or our spies. And this was the only conclusion that such an action could have, other than to propagate certain widely-known opinions on NATO and to launch a call to other European organizations in the name of an abstract, invented internationalism.

Question: Really invented?

Answer: Let us say an internationalism that was simply the mere rhetorical expansion of one's very limits. I want to be extremely clear. I am not at all maintaining that the Dozier kidnapping should have been carried out in another manner: I am not criticizing the act as I suppose other members are doing. No. Instead, I think that the incapacity of armed struggle to construct a political program, the mentality that favors the particular vacuum around it and in which it is lost are all elements that have necessarily brought about those results. That they are exemplary and definitive results.

No matter how many follow-up actions there are, the Red Brigades will not be able to survive the Dozier kidnapping. There is more. The Dozier kidnapping was also, above all, a challenge to the peace movements that have shaken Europe during the past months. It wanted to say, "Yours are stupid illusions, maneuvered hopes! The call is not to mobilization of the masses. There is nothing left but war. The war that only we, the Red Brigades, wage."

The loss of all social sensitivity has therefore turned into presumption and contempt. Armed action was punctually undertaken to strangle mass mobilization in order to create better the illusive space of its own military mystification. Thus, for the Red Brigades, imagining themselves alone against the state, against NATO, the negation of all that exists outside themselves becomes irresistible. And so, having lost on Dozier, they have lost on everything.

Question: Do you believe in the existence of the Grand Old Man?

Answer: No, but it is easy for me to believe that someone imagined one, or that someone introduced himself as such in the market of intrigue.

Can the Red Brigades Rise Again?--We hear the opinions of two judges.

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Is terrorism finished? Is the crisis of the Red Brigades irreversible? After the liberation of General James Lee Dozier inflicted a very harsh blow on organized destruction, the phenomenon of repentant terrorists has assumed visible proportions: are we dealing only with a symptom of the decline of the Red Brigades, or is this the verification of a clamorous failure? Enrico Fenzi, one of the most illustrious of those who have disassociated themselves, says, in this interview, that "the Red Brigades have been defeated," but that if the causes which generated the armed struggle are not removed, "they can maintain their power of attraction intact."

An alarm, then, has been sounded by the repentant members. What does the other side think? In talks with two judges, Alberto Bernardi and Gianfranco Avella, (the first took the depositions of Patrizio Peci and Roberto Sandalo in Turin, the second took that of Michele Viscardi in Bergamo, all three were famous repentant Brigade members), we have gotten the impression that both sides still basically think that the game goes on.

Bernardi affirms: "The political program of terrorism has certainly failed: it did not obtain that consensus from below that all terrorists want; from this, one can also subtract two fundamental strong points: the solidarity pact that fell apart when the terrorists decided to confess--confessions which gave life to a now widespread phenomenon; and the impenetrability, broken down because now the methods and strategies of the Red Brigades are known."

But what is in store for us in the future? According to Bernardi, the phenomenon of the so-called repentant ones is irreversible. "By now, a diffused identity crisis involves a good part of those who are still clandestine: they are not able to rebuild new terroristic structures, and because of this, the legislative initiatives aimed at favoring disassociation have been decisive instruments."

However, attention. "The socio-politico-economic causes at the roots of terrorism have not disappeared," says Bernardi, "nor has the danger of new action been reduced. Groups which try to appear organized are still operating in many big cities, even if they are unable to elaborate destabilization programs. And then there is prison, a real walking mine, a propulsive center that is able to gather, direct, organize and hit both internally and externally."

The judge maintains that there are three routes to follow to prevent the re-founding of the Red Brigades: "In prison, prevent the weaker inmates from being influenced by the stronger ones; promote real cooperation between the police forces which are presently divided by often intolerable rivalry in the fight against terrorism; give faith back to our citizens through a courageous cleanup of the government and an attempt to carry out the popular request for greater justice and higher morality in public life."

Gianfranco Avella maintains that if we can now ask if terrorism is defeated, this is due to the phenomenon of the disassociated and repentant members. Because of this, disassociation should also be rewarded, "as long as the law makes a certain distinction between benefits to the repentant ones and to the ones who have disassociated themselves, keeping in mind that the contribution of the latter is important. Think of the disassociation of Professor Fenzi:

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by talking about the reasons for the birth of armed struggle, he helps those who are still involved in it to think about their fate and about the value of the choices they have made. And this is an extremely relevant fact."

Why then, continually criticize repentance, as some do? Avalla speaks brusquely: "Repentance cannot be seen as mere informing because it is a collective phenomenon, and as such, is undoubtedly the result of a precise political defeat, a defeat that has two fundamental reference points: the basic failure of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the 7 April inquiry on "Autonomia operaia," conducted by my colleague Pietro Calogero. It was a cardinal point for successive investigations of terrorism. Could it be that many of those who talked would have done so if there had not been this blow?"

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

## ECONOMIC POLL SHOWS SOCIALIST 'DISCOURAGEMENT'; GATTAZ REACTS

## Poll Results

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12-18 Apr 82 pp 14-17

[Article by Philippe Durupt: "Concern Changes Camps"]

[Excerpts] Economic concern is resurfacing and creating a certain amount of discouragement within the socialist camp.

The left lost the cantonal elections. Opposition morale received a shot in the arm. One has but to consult the results of this seventh IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute]-VALEURS ACTUELLES survey. The poll began on 16 March, two days after the first ballot of the first ballot of the cantonal elections on the 23d [sic] and two days after the second ballot.

The overall index of satisfaction for the most fortunate and the least unfortunate therefore registers the immediate reaction of the persons polled (one clarification: for a year, IFOP has not questioned the same person twice in order to make up its sampling). This index measures differences observed based on answers to the first survey made on the eve of the presidential election. In passing, we would recall the difference between the figures for the month of January compared with those for April 1981: PC, up 33.5 points (31.2); PS, up 9.2 points (12.8); UDF, down 2.6 points (- 9.3); and the RPR, down 12.7 points (-30.5).

Political "Classes" (in percentages, those who believe that....)\*

## Standard of Living Will Decline

	<u>January</u>	<u>March</u>
PC	19	23
PS-MRG [Leftist Radical Movement]	21	29
RPR	60	66
UDF	62	53
Employers	48	51
Upper-level personnel	38	49
Workers	31	37

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## Unemployment Will Increase

	<u>January</u>	<u>March</u>
PC	20	37
PS-MRG	30	36
RPR	70	55
UDF	63	54
Employers	63	62
Upper-level personnel	51	51
Workers	45	53

## It Is Not Reasonable To Save

	<u>January</u>	<u>March</u>
PC	42	42
PS-MRG (figures rounded off)	45	50
RPR	58	62
UDF	57	58
Employers	60	54
Upper-level personnel	54	66
Workers	45	41

\* These three tables detail answers to questions 2, 3 and 4 by political families and social categories. The poll was made after the cantonal elections, which affected leftist voters.

Sympathizers of the RPR (17.8-point increase) reacted the most strongly to the scores of the cantonal elections, which confirmed the ability of their party to mobilize the opposition. They manifest it by a very clear decline in their political pessimism.

On the other hand, within the majority, the socialists (down 3.6 points) are disappointed by the defeat of the left, but communist sympathizers (up 2.3 points) do not seem affected by that of the PC.

Less politicized than formerly, they seem, on the contrary, more sensitive than followers of the other groups to the material manifestations of change: an increase in the SMIC [Interoccupational minimum growth wage], a strong increase in family and housing allocations. Their election mobilization by the PC was therefore only rendered more difficult.

The same index of satisfaction based on responses by socioprofessional categories showed significant variations: white-collar workers, up 6.7 points (10.6); blue-collar workers, up 6.2 (5.9); farmers, up 2.5 (- 11.1); inactive persons, up .6 (- 4.5); employers, down 3.3 (+ 1); and upper-level personnel, down 8.4 (- 7.7).

Workers and the inactive continue to react well to the "change" from which they benefit.



## Prices and Employment: the "Change" Without Effect

1. In the course of the coming months and compared with what is now happening, will the price increase be:

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Less rapid	6	10	13
As rapid	52	50	54
More rapid	27	30	23
No answer	15	10	10

2. Over the months to come, will the standard of living of the French:

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Improve	7	16	11
Stagnate	38	36	40
Deteriorate	38	38	39
No answer	17	10	10

3. In the months ahead, do you think that the number of unemployed will:

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Go down	8	12	12
Stay the same	19	29	32
Increase	58	52	49
No answer	15	7	7

Our curves resume the percentages of the answers to the first three questions of our seven polls. On the other hand, out of a concern for simplification, our tables show only three figures: those of the April 1981, September 1981 and March 1982 surveys, or the evolution of a year in six-month periods.

Even if they remain in the lead, white-collar workers (down 3.9 points) manifest the beginning of disappointment.

This disappointment is only growing for upper-level personnel and members of the liberal professions.

The strong increase in farmers (up 13.6 points) is the decisive trait of these recent weeks. It undoubtedly expresses the feeling of comfort which the result aroused in rural areas, but it may also be based on more objective elements.

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After plunging into a gloomy pessimism, the agricultural world now has a better perception of the future, whether it be a question of the evolution in its standard of living or in its financial situation.

The measures already taken by the government and the attitude of firmness it promised and held to in the Brussels negotiations are without a doubt related to this new view.

However, generally speaking (combining all categories), the renewed confidence that can be perceived in January gives signs of sagging.

The French people are more concerned about the unemployment trend (49 percent think it will increase, compared with 45 percent) and about the standard of living (39 percent, compared with 35, expect it to deteriorate).

Inflationary expectations seem stable (23 percent -- no change -- expect a more rapid price increase).

This apparent stability stems from the answers of farmers: Only 22 percent, compared with 36 percent, fear an acceleration of inflation. In contrast, small businessmen and upper-level personnel are more pessimistic than they were in January.

In addition, the number of those who believe a slowdown in inflation possible fell from 18.1 to 13.4 percent.

Consequently, the confidence Delors enjoyed is therefore dwindling, while the fight against inflation is only beginning.

Small business and industry owners are divided between two unequal trends: One is pessimistic, with 51.2 percent (compared with 47.7 percent) believing there will be a new drop in their standard of living. The other is more optimistic, with 11.1 percent (compared with 4.8 percent) expecting an improvement.

This recent cleavage in the business world may be the consequence of the government's financial policy. Most are worried about the increased charges of all kinds (see commentary by Yvon Gattaz), while a small minority appreciates public aid to industries in difficulty.

The resurgence of worry is manifested among the white-collar workers: upper-level management personnel and liberal professions, intermediate-level personnel and office workers. Especially among the first group -- 49 percent compared with 37.7 percent -- the fear is that their standard of living will decline and 28.5 percent, compared with 15.8 percent, believe their financial situation will get worse.

Indiscretions with respect to credit requests by spendthrift ministries (there is talk of a potential deficit of 210 billion francs) bring the threat of a new turn of the tax screw, which would spare very few persons, whence the atmosphere of apprehension, a new phenomenon, beginning to reign among intermediate-level personnel and office workers.

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## Savings: Stability

4. Considering the economic situation and the wage and price trend, do you think it is reasonable to save at this time?

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Certainly not	47	49	49
Probably not	47	49	49
Yes, perhaps	40	37	40
Definitely	40	37	40
No answer	13	14	11

5. In the past 6 months, how has your financial situation changed?

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Improved	9	8	9
The same	51	56	54
Not as good or worse	34	32	34
No answer	6	4	3

6. What is your current financial situation?

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Saving a fair amount of money	2	1	1
Saving a little money	26	28	30
Just making ends meet	52	53	52
Going into debt, using savings	11	11	11
No answer	9	7	6

7. In the months ahead, do you expect your financial situation to:

	<u>Apr 81</u>	<u>Sep 81</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>
Improve	15	17	18
Stay the same	50	49	52
Be not as good or worse	20	22	19
No answer	15	12	11

(The results presented in this document are from the seventh installment of the IFOP-VALEURS ACTUELLES economic barometer: Some 1,987 interviews were conducted from 16 to 23 March 1982, with a national sampling representing the French population over the age of 15.)

Pessimism about unemployment manifested among employers in January (63.8 percent compared with 57.5 percent in November) now extends to white-collar workers (48.5 percent in March compared with 41.6 percent in January) and blue-collar workers (52.8 percent compared with 44.8 percent).

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Pessimism is growing among communist sympathizers (36.6 percent compared with 20.4), but is declining among followers of the RPR (54.5 percent compared with 69.6). This phenomenon is a spectacular illustration of the differences in interpretation depending on the "political glasses" of each: the conviction, among Chirac's followers, that the government will prevent layoffs by artificial measures; and the fear among communists that it cannot or will not do so.

Responses concerning saving intentions reveal a great stability masking profound modifications based on socioprofessional categories.

Inactive persons (42.8 percent compared with 39.9) and blue-collar workers (43.8 percent compared with 42.6) are more numerous among those expecting to save.

Answers are more diverse among employers, divided by the same split with, on the one hand, an increase in those who expect to save "perhaps" (30.9 percent compared with 24.7), and on the other hand, a confirmation (34.3 percent compared with 21.9) of the intention not to save, expressed doubtfully in the previous poll.

The response is frankly negative among upper-level personnel and the liberal professions: 39.8 percent compared with 30.7 say they will definitely not save. Only 6.6 percent, compared with 11 percent, are of the opposite opinion. The ebb in saving exclusively affects socialist sympathizers, only 42.6 percent of whom -- compared with 47.5 -- deem it to be reasonable.

The reaction of these savers with relatively high incomes and who are more likely than others to invest at a risk is very likely the cause of the slump in the Stock Exchange since the beginning of March. These clients are those most interested in the conclusions of the Dautresme report expected this week.

If one compares this decline in the intention to save on the part of upper-level personnel (and intermediate-level as well) with the very high increase in their spending on leisure and entertainment, one conclusion is inevitable: At all levels of responsibility, management personnel is going through a crisis of demobilization.

**Gattaz Expresses Worry**

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12-18 Apr 82 pp 18-19.

[Interview with Yvon Gattaz, president of French employers, by Jean-Francois Gautier; date and place not given]

[Text] The president of French employers met with Jacques Delors Thursday morning and was received at the Elysee on Thursday afternoon. On 16 April, he will meet with Pierre Mauroy. On the agenda: business expenses. Yvon Gattaz details them for us, while commenting on our survey of the economy.

[Question] On the whole, how do you analyze the results of the poll?

[Answer] I shall first of all make two preliminary observations based on your figures.

To begin, I would note that after a year's time, the personal concern of the French people are nearly the same, whether it be a matter of the standard of living or job security.

Next, I would say that the country's economic problems seem neither more nor less troublesome this year than a year ago.

[Question] How do you interpret this?

[Answer] The minirecovery in consumption that we experienced between September 1981 and February 1982 had a calming effect on opinion. Without it, I believe that the results of your poll would definitely have been less good.

Indeed, purchasing power has not dwindled. On the contrary, it rose for certain categories. Consumption is quite good but the French people are not asking whether the products they are buying are imported, which is, on the other hand, one of my main concerns. On the whole, this minor recovery has acted as a smoke screen masking the gravity of the situation.

The French people are therefore unaware of the real situation. They do not realize that this recovery could be only temporary. I am struck by the lack of knowledge of the French people concerning the general phenomena of the economy. That is one of the revelations of this poll.

[Question] How do you explain the fact that persons who feel that their jobs are threatened are fewer in number?

[Answer] Wage earners feel "safe" because of a certain number of measures taken in the hope of maintaining employment in enterprises: Aid to investment, accompanied by a condition to hire, additional limitations of all kind, legal or paralegal, placed on layoffs: All these things may have created a false feeling of security, for these frail railings will collapse if the enterprises go down.

In this area, we must not use backward reasoning. It is employment that is the consequence of prosperity, not the opposite. We must be careful not to create artificial jobs that are administered, subsidized and in the end, paid for, by taxpayers. The only lasting jobs are profitable jobs!

[Question] Our poll reveals a slight tendency to spend more. What do you think of this?

[Answer] The average purchasing power of the French people has increased 50 percent in 13 years. Everywhere else it has declined or remained the same. In Great Britain, for example, it dropped 2 percent last year. Consequently, here in France we are in a totally exceptional situation.

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However, I am not sure that this is any guarantee for the future. I fear that this may be only an easy, short-term policy. I am afraid we shall have to choose between purchasing power and job power. We must know whether the French are willing to demonstrate solidarity, whether they are ready to understand that the increase in purchasing power may be at the cost of jobs.

Most of the great industrialized countries, beginning with the United States, have understood that even if the word "austerity" is not very popular, we have to know how to use it.

Growth in purchasing is an essential dogma of our society. It is difficult to question it. But it may turn out to be an obstacle, a hindrance to our economic recovery.

[Question] You would then substitute an active pessimism for the calm optimism of the French?

[Answer] Business executives are not of a pessimistic bent. This is contrary to the determination to undertake anything. They are realists, but realism forces one to look around, to see difficulties and obstacles, those apparent in the immediate future and those shaping up on the horizon.

We are now worried, deeply worried, over the months ahead. We fear that businesses may fail and that layoffs will result. I am afraid that the poll you make in a year will have very gloomy results!

[Question] How can you say that so soon?

[Answer] I have four reasons to be worried: First of all, the expenses of businesses are multiplying and reaching abnormal levels. This is particularly true of additional social expenditures imposed on us since the beginning of the year.

I would put that bill at 93 billion francs for the next 12 months. These overwhelming burdens compromise the survival of our businesses and could lead to many failures, with the resulting disappearance of the jobs of those employed there.

My second concern is that investments are declining, eaten away by the acceleration in social, fiscal and financial charges. The competitiveness of businesses will suffer and the less competitive we are, the less we shall be able to invest, especially since the production capacity of industry is only being 73 percent used, when we know that there can be no investment without at least 85 percent.

My third concern is foreign trade. It is a tangible, undebatable barometer. It reveals a deficit that has gone from 3 billion francs a month at the beginning of 1981 to 5 billion by the end of the year. It has oscillated between 5 and 8 billion francs since that time. This is double last year's figure and it can be particularly serious for our country's economy and currency.

Finally, there is the accumulation of all kinds of limitations burdening the management of enterprises and getting in the way of decisions. All the recent measures, even those reputed to be not very costly, hurt the flexibility of enterprises. And yet, flexibility, the adaptability of a business to the problems of the moment, to circumstances, international competition and technological changes, is the very secret of competitiveness. And naturally, in the long run, it is always jobs that will bear the cost.

Addition of the CNPF [National Council of French Employers]

(Balance sheet of the increase in business expenditures during the year)

Amount Available (in billions of francs)

National budget drawn up in 1982	14.7
Professional tax (anticipated increase for 1982)	8.6
Social security (November 1981 measures)	12
Fifth week and 39-hour week (annual cost)	45
For 1982	36
Effect of Auroux Reform (assuming an effect limited to 1 percent of wage mass)	13
Total	93.3

To these figures one must add the measures to finance Social Security anticipated for next summer and the effects of retirement at age 60, beginning in March 1983. These two headings were not included.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

MAUROY ISSUES LETTER ON 1983 BUDGET: EMPLOYMENT MAIN GOAL

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22-28 Mar 82 p 20

[Text of letter from Premier Pierre Mauroy to his ministers and secretaries of state on the 1983 budget]

[Text] Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 10 March 1982, the president of the Republic asked that the government, in preparing the 1983 appropriations bill, give top priority to employment and keep the next year's government budget deficit at around 3 percent of the gross domestic product. The initial budget preparations for 1983 show that in order to carry out this decision the government will have to be disciplined, imaginative and determined.

Economic growth is still limited, even supported by the policy carried out since last year, and will lead to only a moderate increase in government resources, while some unavoidable expenditures will continue to rise rapidly. Maintaining control over public finance will, in these conditions, entail some difficult choices.

The purpose of the initial and current stage of preparing for the 1983 budget is to provide the government with the information it needs to make these choices (...). You must first compute the "carryover" budget or, in other words, maintain in 1983 the means stipulated in the 1982 appropriations bill.

Moreover, you will compute the savings which should be realized over the previous budget, as a result of indepth questioning of the orientations of the prior government, and as a result of any measures you may suggest to simplify or reduce duties or procedures. This real questioning or challenge of the approved services that I am asking you to conduct with the greatest determination is absolutely essential. It is the only way the government will have the means needed to implement its priorities.

You will then figure the cost of the new measures required, over and above those carried over, so that the activities that you believe the government might approve can be assured of financing.

The following points should serve as a basis for your work:

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1. The carryover budget will not be subject to any increase in operating resources or to a net increase in jobs.

It will represent an updating of 1982 endowments on the basis of assumptions of price trends or civil service indices that will be sent to you by the ministry in charge of the budget. It will reflect the deletion of nonrenewable appropriations or appropriations for exceptional operations(...).

2. Your proposed cuts should reflect the new orientation of the 1983 budget. The 1982 appropriations bill is in fact still deeply marked by the weight of decisions made by the previous government. Your questioning of prior policies should lead to an elimination of activities which are now pointless or inappropriate. What you must do is to find the means for financing government priorities so that the budget, a major political vehicle, will reflect the desire for change behind our action. I am asking you to personally supervise this exercise, which should not in any way be regarded as routine and should lead to truly significant results.

You must proceed in particular, and systematically, to review the numerous and varied government aid programs (aid to business, export aids, aid of a social nature, housing aid, and so on...) and in general all government financing schemes(...).

I will also ask the minister in charge of the budget to show me the items where he thinks he can realize some savings(...).

3. Proposals for new measures (expenditures and appropriations) which you consider necessary should be made in a highly selective way. Only those requests you classify according to a clearly defined order of priority will be considered. Resources that could be allocated to finance these measures will in fact be severely restricted, because taxes cannot be increased. After the considerable leveling of the corrected appropriations bills for 1981 and the 1982 budget, the 1983 appropriations bills should reflect a continuity in government activity, but at the same time take into account the difficult situation of public finance.

In this spirit, I have not ruled out the possibility of spreading some objectives out over time, without jeopardizing the main programs agreed. You should also try whenever possible to relieve the national government of financial responsibilities that could be handled by others, and particularly by government enterprises.

4. Throughout your work you should be guided by one primary goal: to preserve and increase employment. This means that for every expenditure you should ask yourselves whether it is the best way to help bring down unemployment, or if there may not be other preferable choices(...).

The 1983 budget should be characterized more by a change in the content of government expenditure than by an increase in the amount of this expenditure.

I am counting on every member of government to make a personal effort to be disciplined and imaginative in this task. I am asking everyone to weigh the stakes carefully.

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21

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

CNPF STRESSES BASIC, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, INNOVATION

Paris LA RECHERCHE in French Mar 82 p 298

[Text] The National Council of French Employers (CNPF) has gradually become aware of the strategic importance of industrial research. In Strasbourg a little over a year ago, some 2,000 business executives marked their agreement with the slogan "Innovating today for tomorrow's market." On 5 January, Guy Brana, vice president of the CNPF, and Georges Boudeville, chairman of its committee on innovation and research, presented a veritable plan of action in order to be up to the stakes advanced by the government with respect to research.

The work of the CNPF on research and development took place at the same time as that of the national colloquium, not on its fringes, because the employers constantly make reference to the objectives of the minister of research and technology. This is not in a totally integrated fashion, however, because business executives have not been very assiduous in the operations of Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Nevertheless, the employers' representatives make the essential objectives announced by the government their own. In particular, they agree to take up the challenge of raising the contribution of enterprises from 1.1 to 1.5 percent of the GNP for research and development.

The CNPF marks its admiration for the organization and technological results of Japan -- what could be more normal for industrialists! -- but it notes that that country is in the process of considerably accelerating its basic research effort and that one cannot do without such an effort. This is a new remark coming from officials on Avenue Pierre 1 de Serbie.

"Industrial research is the responsibility of industrialists." The CNPF could scarcely state the opposite, but in the current context, this should mean that business executives commit themselves to implementing a strategy of innovation in order to come out of the crisis without asking for assistance from the government. In fact, without rejecting aid finalized by the government (Armed Forces contract, from the PTT [Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Service] and from the Ministry of Research), the CNPF recommends the adoption of "horizontal," neutral and automatic measures in order to stimulate technological development. The list of these measures is long and sums up all the proposals drafted in the past several years by the departments of the Ministry of Industry and also by the Ministry of Research. These proposals did not receive the

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backing of the government at that time: promoting the transfer of research workers; doing away with the professional tax applied to research centers; putting into effect a procedure to facilitate the marketing of new products, and so on; and promoting collective research. In the field of professional, partnership and collective research, employers are in fact changing their approach. After having been forgotten, even fought by the big enterprises, the technical centers now see their importance recognized for the dissemination of technical culture. Not only will their role vis-a-vis the small and medium-size industries be strengthened, but the CNPF suggests that the government could entrust the foremanship of certain major projects to technical centers.

"An economic necessity, innovation is also a social need, with respect to an improvement in the quality of life, working conditions and our environment," stated Guy Brana, who, in conclusion, makes change dependent on a financial measure, however. Following the model of Japanese practice, "all enterprises should be able to enjoy tax incentives for research and development, based on an annual increase in research and development spending or on the annual hiring of research workers and technicians and charged to the value-added tax." In November 1981, Jean-Pierre Chevenement proposed cooperating with his colleague in Finance in studying a similar tax proposal. It would not be exception for the Rue de Rivoli, in response to circumstantial political pressure, to agree to increase public spending on research from one year to the next. Automatism, neutrality (no direct intervention of officials anxious to meddle in the business of enterprises) and constant tax incentives for research cannot fail to arouse the fears of public accountants. The adoption of this measure would be a definite test of the government's will to insert research into the production structure...

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ECONOMIC

SPAIN

CONTINUING HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT MAY RADICALIZE PSOE, PCE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Apr 82 pp 60-63

[Text] It is difficult to pull out of the crisis. But much more so in a country that is disillusioned, discouraged, sunk into disinterest and apathy, that does not know where it is going. These last 7 years, with their legacy of 2 million unemployed, prices gone through the roof, bankrupt companies, controlled wages, a drop in investment and slackness in demand, have done great damage to the morale of the Spanish people. There is a relinquishment of responsibility, a lack of initiative, a disinclination to take risks, generalized apathy. People are functioning day by day, without prospects for the future, every member of society filling his role to the minimum extent, only in order to survive.

And there is no one to get the country moving forward. The Spanish economy is not doing well, it is at a standstill, with a zero growth rate, and turning out more than 1,000 unemployed persons a day. Demand is falling, and investments are not being made, so that the 150,000 young people who enter the job market every year are not finding openings. And the 2 million officially unemployed continue without jobs; half of them not receiving unemployment benefits. As if this were not enough, another 4 million Spaniards who should be working or looking for work are idle, "discouraged," and are no longer even taking the trouble to look for employment.

In order not to lose jobs there would need to be a growth rate of at least 4 percent per year. But at the present time that is impossible. All the experts, of one kind or another, realize this. As a result, unemployment has become a fact that will be with us at least until the middle of the decade. It is growing daily, along with general discouragement.

The latest unemployment figures are a source of real concern. There are already 2 million Spaniards who were officially out of work at the beginning of 1982, according to the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Although this makes us the fourth country in Europe in total number of unemployed, we are the country with the highest rate of unemployment (15.39 percent of the active population.)

This reveals a serious basic problem in the Spanish economy: its very low rate of activity. Of the 38 million people in Spain, 26.7 million are of

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working age (16-64 years). Then, out of this potential labor force, only 48.2 percent are working or looking for work. The rest are idle. In other European countries, the percentage of active persons is much higher--up to 81.4 percent--with the result that, although some have a higher total of unemployed, their rate of unemployment is less serious than in Spain.

And if the 2 million unemployed are considered as we look at the percentage of those employed, the figure is hair-raising: at the beginning of 1982 only 10,848,000 Spaniards were employed in the strict sense of the word. What this means is that we are living in a country where approximately only one out of every four people is working. The low rate of activity in Spain is due to a lower rate of female employment compared with other countries (20.7 percent as opposed to 32.7 percent in France, for example), and to the existence of a large number of Spanish people (especially youths) who are not even trying to get work, given the difficulty there is in finding employment. They are the so-called "discouraged ones."

This situation shows us that there is tremendous "hidden unemployment," people idle today, who if the economic situation should improve tomorrow would hasten to look for work. And it especially points up the huge waste of human resources that we have in Spain: almost 6 million people who should be working, and are not working, if we continue the level of activity of other developed countries.

There are three indications which show unequivocally that the problem of unemployment is not improving. First, the decline in the number of employed persons: if in the third quarter of 1981 only 2,600 jobs were lost, in the fourth quarter the decline in employment was 91,100. Secondly, the increase in the number of the unemployed: in the third quarter of 1981 the unemployed increased by 94,300, and in the fourth quarter of the year they increased by 110,400. And thirdly, the number of unemployed registered (those who take the trouble to register in an employment office) increased by 42,794 in the month of January 1982, as opposed to a monthly average of some 22,000 new registrations throughout 1981. And the figure was 30,214 in February.

However, the situation is somewhat less dramatic than it was a year ago, and the growth of unemployment has been slowed: the number of people employed fell less in the fourth quarter of 1981 than in the same period of 1980, and unemployment has grown somewhat less than it did a year ago (110,400 as opposed to 125,800 persons). All in all, the most positive news has come from the construction sector, which only lost 2,100 jobs in the fourth quarter of 1981, as against the 43,000 which it lost a year before. It appears that the results of the triennial housing plan are beginning to be felt. The service sector has also improved: only 6,900 jobs were lost in the fourth quarter of 1981, as opposed to 32,000 a year before. But where it is going terribly badly is in industry and agriculture. The restructuring of industry and the plans for modernization have involved a fall in employment of 55,600 persons in the fourth quarter of 1981 (there were 39,000 in the fourth quarter of 1980). And in the rural area the loss in employment stood at 26,000 persons (as against 17,500 in 1980).

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The provinces with the greatest rates of unemployment at the beginning of 1982 were Bránada and Seville (23.5 percent), followed by Cadiz (23 percent), Malaga (20.9 percent) and Badajoz (20.1 percent). The growth in unemployment among women is greater than that among men; and, by ages, there is an increase among those older than 55 (early retirements). Finally, there are already 356,191 Spanish homes where the head of the family is out of work, and there is no other person working in the household.

Spain is one of the countries which spends the greatest amount on unemployment relief in relation to total production (GDP). However, at the beginning of January only 38.8 percent of the unemployed people registered were collecting unemployment benefits, which is the lowest rate of coverage of any industrialized country. And, moreover, there are great differences in the coverage between some provinces and others.

The UGT [General Union of Workers] union has just demanded that the government "immediately put into effect the measures which have already been agreed upon and established as regards unemployment coverage," although the issue definitely runs up against a lack of funds. The idea of the unions seems to be to expand the coverage to 100 percent for unemployed persons over 25 years of age, and to structure other assistance, linked to education, for younger unemployed persons. The unemployment problem is ravaging all the industrialized countries, where the rate of growth of the economies is so low that it does not allow the provision of work for those who are entering the job market. But the unusual feature about Spain is that, as well as not creating work, it is abolishing jobs, which is not happening in other countries. Since 1977, the number of jobs lost has risen to 1,200,000. And Spain is the only industrial country which has lost jobs, year after year, since 1976. The majority of the countries of the OECD have created jobs, however few, or only have lost them for an isolated year.

With all this in view, it seems probable that the promise of the National Agreement on Employment (ANE) to create 250,000 jobs will not be fulfilled at the end of the year. Perhaps, if there is growth of 1.5-2 percent, instead of abolishing some 300,000 jobs this year, we will manage to lose only 100,000. This is going to bring about an extensive debate on the significance of the ANE, which the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party] and the PCE want to bring up in Parliament in June. And so it is that reality is demonstrating that the modernization of salaries in 1981 has not resulted in the creation of jobs, which could increase the discouragement and disunity among those who for 2 years have been losing purchasing power--the workers. Looking to the future, little can be done for some years. According to a comprehensive report made in 1981 by the Center for Economic Forecasting, which is connected with the University-Business Foundation, the growth in the working population up to 1985 will be nil, and then after that, the rate of unemployment will be 17 percent, with the situation beginning to improve in the second half of the decade. While the government appears to be cautiously optimistic about the battle against unemployment, emphasizing that it is growing at a slower pace, the Left and the businessmen agree that the issue, although it has no short-term solution, cannot be surmounted with the current economic policy which the government is carrying on.

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The business experts think that the strategy must be changed, and a series of measures to double its growth must be set in motion. Measures which Jose Diego Teijeiro, economic advisor of the banking employers' organization AEB

What Goes Along With Unemployment

Total funds devoted to unemployment in percentage of GDP(1980)

Spain *	2.02
Canada	1.48
Germany	1.25
France	1.19
United Kingdom	1.04
United States	0.64
Italy	0.40
Japan	0.39

\* In Spain only 38.8 percent of "registered" unemployed persons collected unemployment benefits in January 1982.

sums up this way: restabilization and strengthening of the health of the economy, reduction of production costs, liberalization of prices to make investment profitable, establishment of a financial consolidation program for businesses, and liberalization of the financial system. "With these five measures it would be possible to grow by more than 2.5 percent this year, and the foundation would be laid for 4.5 to 6 percent growth in coming years," Teijeiro says. From another point of view, the socialists are calling for an increase in growth and rationalization of public investment, for an adjustment of the work day in some sectors, reducing the price of non-salary labor costs, changes in the system of community employment, increase in coverage and establishment of specific programs for unemployed workers who lack benefits and for youths.

In any case, there is one topic which is beginning to cause serious concern: the extremely low working population in Spain. And on the day when we begin to supply employment for the 2 million unemployed, those 4 million discouraged people are going to start to "emerge." They will be the unemployed of the second half of the decade. We're in for it.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LABOR LEADER ATTACKS SCHMIDT'S POLICIES

Hamburg STERN in German 22 April 82 p 210

[Article by Leonhard Mahlein, chairman of the IG Druck und Papier (Printing and Paper Workers Union) and member of the SPD since 1957: "Get Straight, Helmut Schmidt"]

[Text] Anyone attending the SPD congress at Munich and looking for an easy explanation of the drastic loss of confidence in the Social Democrats will put the blame on this or that hapless cabinet member. But this would only be a political shell game. Herr Lambsdorff would not be able to constantly humiliate Minister of Labor Ehrenberg if he did not have the backing of the Federal chancellor.

It is the politics of the Social Democrat head of government that are responsible for voters deserting the SPD. Helmut Schmidt is

--for peace--while creating the "arms buildup;"

--for environmental protection--yet nature is being neglected, violated and exploited because commercial interests almost always have priority over ecological ones;

--for social justice--though the distribution of wealth and income today is less equitable than it was in 1969;

--for democratic freedoms--while the rights of people with dissenting opinions are being more and more curtailed and opposition from such quarters as the peace movement is being slandered; the minister of defense orders soldiers of the Bundeswehr, demonstrating in favor of disarmament while in uniform, to be led off in handcuffs like common criminals. Is this Social Democratic policy, Genosse Apel? (Genosse [Comrade] the traditional term of address among Social Democrats; Gustav Noske was the SPD minister of war who ordered troops to open fire on workers in 1919).

We trade unionists don't want a different government, what we want is a different brand of politics. Because power can also be gambled away by abandoning one's principles slice by slice, just for the sake of remaining in power a little while longer.



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I am not going to tell the delegates to the party congress what resolutions they should pass. But I would like to warn them against one danger: if we Social Democrats continue to ignore the interests of working people, not only will we lose our capacity to govern but even our capacity to sit in the opposition.

My demands on the credibility of the Social Democrat Party are:

--an employment program with an income tax surcharge for civil servants, self-employed persons and all persons with an annual income of over 60,000 marks (married persons 120,000 marks). We need more and better growth but not at the price of tax breaks for private businesses. What we need is a government funded investment program.

--Repeal of the rearmament resolution. What it will bring is more armaments rather than less. The least that I expect from the SPD congress is a resolution that will halt the production and deployment of nuclear missiles and warheads until the Geneva conferences are concluded. The SPD has got to remind its Federal chancellor that he himself proposed just such a moratorium just a number of years ago.

Certainly compromise belongs to the rules of politics. But there can be no compromise on this issue of our survival! A military arms buildup in the Federal Republic is being promoted at the expense of cutbacks in social programs. We don't need any Reagan/Thatcher brand of politics in the FRG, what we need instead is a battle against unemployment that must be waged not with pay cuts but with the creation of new purchasing power. According to estimates of the IG Metall (Metal Workers Union), businesses will enjoy a reduction in taxes of 2.9 billion marks between 1982 and 1985, while working people will be shouldering a burden of 48.5 billion marks. This is the wrong way.

Get straight, Helmut Schmidt.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ON POSSIBLE EARLY ELECTIONS

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 9 Apr 82 pp 10-13

[Article by Donato Speroni]

[Text]

Vote again? What for? The consensus behind the present government is strong and growing, so voters are decidedly opposed to early elections. There are new factors, though, on the left, as the MONDO-Makno survey reveals; one of them is the PCI....

Opposition to early elections, approval of the present government, hardening consensus among the parties supporting it. The data culled from the 5th MONDO-Makno opinion poll might have been specially prescribed as tranquilizers for worried majority party leaders. Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini can bask in unprecedented personal approval among respondents, almost a third of whom picked him for the record as the best of all possible prime ministers. PSI secretary Bettino Craxi rejoiced at his party's beating out the PCI in a sensational finding which, as we shall see, calls for some prudence in its interpretation. DC party secretary Flaminio Piccoli can find some indications in the poll findings that would confirm a substantial gain in the electorate's perception of his majority party's image and voter approval.

The poll [Osservatorio] (see earlier poll results in IL MONDO, n° 24 in 1980, and n°s 5, 26, and 46, 1981) is based on a sampling of some 2,000 people, selected at the beginning of the series on the basis of criteria representing the nation's demographic and social makeup, to which the Makno organization turns at intervals for answers to a set of political questions. This procedure makes it possible to keep abreast of shifts in opinion with a very low margin of error.

Early Elections

Only a little over 10 percent of respondents wants early elections (see Figure 1). The processed data, when broken down, make it possible to come up with a composite picture of the Italian citizen who

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would like a chance to vote early: he is male, lives in the central-south portion of the country, and belongs to the middle class. On the other hand, almost 63 percent of respondents are flatly opposed to that idea. And a good 43 percent of those opposed say they are "decidedly opposed."

## The Government

Spadolini's popularity, which was evident even in the survey prior to this one, is confirmed now by a remarkable fact: for the first time in the history of this survey a government enjoys a higher approval rating than the opposition parties (Figure 2). Not only does the Spadolini government's approval rating of 35 percent top the 28 percent it won in October: it is actually twice as high as the rating granted preceding DC-led governments -- never topping 17 or 18 percent -- while negative ratings ran around 50 percent.

Spadolini's greatest gains came among males (the gap between the no and yes responses, which was running higher than 21 points in October, stands at 2 points today, with support running close to 40 percent), among the very young (approval rose from 16 to 31 percent), among the middle-aged (Spadolini gained some 20 percent among those in their 40s), and in the northeast, where support rose from 18 to 42 percent.


The favor with which the present government is looked upon is borne out again in respondents' choice of the [cabinet] formula best suited to solve the nation's problems: the current makeup (a five-party coalition headed by the Republicans) won 13-percent approval (topped by only a single point in approval for the left-wing government (see Table 1). Which prime minister do respondents favor? Spadolini (see Figure 3) got more than 31 percent approval. In June 1981 he was the choice of only 3 percent of respondents, but by October he had risen to 17 percent. Bettino Craxi is holding steady at the comfortable level he won in the past, with around 23 percent. The other lay-party leaders, who were all riding high in October, are barely holding their ground or losing it today: Valerio Zanone has slipped from 3.7 to 3.5 percent, Parco Pannella from 5.9 to 4.8 percent, Pietro Longo from 4.7 to 3.5 percent; Giuseppe Saragat has gained -- up from 2.5 to 3 percent -- while Bruno Visentini slipped from 5.7 to 2.1 percent.

In the little knot of likely Christian Democrat candidates, there is a pronounced absence of new contenders for the prime minister's seat. Only Giulio Andreotti (up from 14.1 to 14.5 percent) has shortened the odds in his favor, while the rest have seen the odds lengthening: Francesco Cossiga's approval rating has dropped from 7.9 to 6.7 percent, Amintore Fanfani's from 7.9 to 6.9 percent, Benigno Zaccagnini's from 10.9 to 8.8 percent, and Arnaldo Forlani's more sharply from 9.7 to 4.4 percent.

Among the opposition ranks, Giorgio Almirante still has his following (down from 5.7 to 5.3 percent), but the most significant finding is the continuing decline in Enrico Berlinguer's stock from 18.6 to 15.4.

KEY to Figure 1 : What Do You Think of Early Elections?


- (1) Strongly in favor (5%)
- (2) Moderately in favor (5.7%)
- (3) Moderately opposed
- (4) Strongly opposed
- (5) No response
- (6) Don't know
- (7) Don't care



KEY to Figure 2: Is the Present Government the Right One to Deal with the Nation's Problems?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (3) Don't know
- (4) June (80,81)
- (5) October 81
- (6) March 82
- (7) in percentages

**L'attuale governo è adatto a risolvere i problemi del paese?**



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It should be noted, though, that the PCI secretary's ratings in the polls have always been marked by sunny peaks and dark valleys.

## The Parties

In addition to Berlinguer's decline as a leader, there are other events that demonstrate the PCI's ongoing state of crisis, a state of affairs still more alarming to Botteghe Oscure in view of the fact that the survey was taken only a few days prior to UNITÀ's sensational stroke of bad luck on the Cirillo case. All the PCI's pet patterns for government are on the decline: national unity (see Table 1) skidded from 10.6 to 4.5 percent, the various alternatives declined from 25.5 to 21.1 percent, and the experts cabinet idea plummeted from 18.8 to 9.9 percent approval. Most significant of all, though, is the withering away of PCI voter support: by comparison with their standing in the October survey, the communists are down by about 5 points (see Table 1). In quantitative terms, however, the communist losses are hardly the stuff of tragedy: the percentage data are not all that significant, since it is widely known in politically sensitive circles that many communists (unlike republican or socialist sympathizers) are reluctant to say how they voted. Further, that 19 percent of support voiced for the PCI is more or less compatible with the share of votes the Makno sample predicted for the PCI in the last elections.

IL MONDO and the Makno organization also decided to look further into the effects of the PCI's break with Moscow over what is happening in Poland. On the whole, even after the schism with the East, opposition to the PCI's sitting in the cabinet was still very strong (37.7 percent). Clearly readier to go along with allowing communists a voice in government, though (see Table 2), are males from 25 to 44 in central-southern Italy who are part of the working population (i.e., those who have or are looking for work), especially executives, businessmen, white-collar workers, craftsmen, and shopkeepers. On the whole, though, over all the social classes and all age-groups, the nos outnumber the yesses.

One finding that doesn't change from survey to survey -- which leaves a broad margin for error in the event of early elections -- is the high percentage of "don't know" responses to all political questions. The "don't know" column has been expanding steadily. Figure 1 shows 46.4 percent of respondents saying that none of the parties comes close to their way of thinking or actually refusing to answer. That figure was 43 percent 5 months ago. There are a great many undecideds in central Italy (50.9 percent), though there are fewer in the south and on the islands (40.5 percent); most of them are women (49.7 percent) of just about every age-group and, understandably, there are a lot of them among the unemployed (58.3 percent, no less). Another factor related to the uncertainty of early elections is what seems to be increasing readiness to shift party allegiance (Table 2). There is unquestionably a rise in the number of respondents stating that the party they voted for had not performed as expected (12.9 percent is

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the highest level yet recorded); increasing fastest of all are the numbers of respondents who say that their own party behaved so badly of recent months that they will never vote for it again: this drastic view was voiced oftener by males than by women (8.7 to 3.4 percent), and most frequently by students, craftsmen, and businessmen (all with percentages around 10). All right: who does have clear ideas, and who is willing to say openly how he will vote, and why? The data that emerge clearly from the survey (Table 1) show, in addition to the PCI's decline, the solid position of the PSI which, with close to 23 percent approval, consolidates and even improves on its already sensational standing in earlier surveys, and the brisk recovery of the DC which, with 30.8 percent approval, comes close to its track record in the last elections. The minor lay parties are more or less stable, with a slight decline for the PRI from 8.2 to 6.6 percent, thereby demonstrating that Spadolini's popularity is his personal advantage, not shared with his party. Even so, the PRI, viewed in the context of shifts over the first three surveys and compared with the outcome of the last elections, is on its way up.

Declining are the radicals and the groups to the left of the PCI (7.3 percent overall, as compared with 10.2 percent 4 months ago), while the MSI actually gained 2 points, thus turning around what had been gradual decline.

The most sensational recovery, though, had to be that of the PCI, for which the approval rate rose from 7.7 to 17.7 percent, while the negative replies dropped from 27.5 to 24.7 percent; these data, when combined with the others described above, show that the PCI is losing votes among its own membership, but that it is at the same time improving its image among citizens who do not vote its ticket. As for the PSI, its image as a party is still moot. It is the party that tallied more approval (21 percent as against the 19.7 percent it won last October); but it is also the target of a high percentage of disapproval (26.5 percent).

#### The Issues

Again, they are terrorism, inflation, unemployment, and the housing shortage. The survey confirmed, in the same order, the four issues found by the survey 4 months ago (which differ somewhat from the ones Spadolini sees as most urgent: terrorism, inflation, moral issues, and international order). Terrorism was perceived by respondents to this survey as one of the four prime issues to be dealt with (see Table 3). The importance of this issue rises with respondent age, from 55.4 percent of those below 19 to 68.4 percent among those over 55. Inflation still holds second place, with 51.3 percent of respondents finding it vital. Again, this issue is more acutely perceived among the elderly, and less so among the young. The picture is neatly reversed when it comes to unemployment, which almost 70 percent of the youngest voters and students perceived as THE issue.

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On the whole, the trend over the past several months would seem to show a slight decline in the importance of economic issues (inflation, unemployment, and even the dismal pitch of labor relations -- down from 5.2 to 4.6 percent), and a contrary rise in the perceived importance of social problems: housing, pensions, and health care). Housing was singled out as an issue by 39.7 percent of respondents (and it is in first place, ahead of terrorism and inflation in towns with more than 250,000 population). Pensions accounted for 31.9 percent of complaints, as compared with 29.5 percent 4 months ago. This issue is cited particularly among respondents in the northeastern regions.

Growing demand for better health care is emerging with increasing clarity: from 23.6 percent in June, it has risen to 30.8 percent as of now. Complaints about health care are particularly prevalent in central Italy (36.7 percent). Least intense are indications of discontent with school reorganization (down from 16.7 to 13.5 percent). Still high on the concern index is drug abuse, although it too suffered a slight decline from 32.9 percent to 28.5. Those respondents most concerned about the issue of drug abuse are the youngest (37.2 percent), housewives (39.5 percent), and the unemployed (47.4 percent).

Among other issues cited by respondents to the survey, there was a clear decline in complaints about law enforcement: calls for restoration of the death penalty dropped from 12.4 to 6.8 percent, and those for police reform from 7 to 3 percent. Also declining are complaints about reconstruction in the earthquake-devastated areas (from 16.1 to 14.3 percent), as are calls for world peace (down from 18.8 percent to 13.3). Just about holding their own are the issues of amendments to the Concordat (up from 3.7 to 4 percent), updating the civil and criminal codes (down from 10.7 to 8.4 percent), and electoral reform (down from 6.4 to 4.6 percent), the establishment of a presidential republic (up from 2.3 to 2.5 percent), the fight against pornography (up from 3.1 to 4 percent), the injection of morality into politics (down from 15.2 to 14.3 percent). Slightly on the upswing (from 1 to 3.2 percent) is respondent demand for a new abortion law.

#### The Unions

What do voters think of the performance of the CGIL, CISL, and UIL of recent months? Not much different from what they thought when the October poll was taken. Approval rating inched up from 12.2 to 12.3 percent over October, while 31.6 respondents felt that the unions are doing some things right and some things wrong (29.8 percent were ambivalent). Approval ratings were highest among the very young (19 percent) and among retirees (20.5 percent). Fewer respondents (13.3 percent as against 16.7 percent in October) thought organized labor's activities irrelevant. A good many (up from 14.7 percent to 19.3 percent) were uncertain, while those who took a dim view of labor's activity declined from 26.5 to 23.5 percent.

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


FIGURE 4. Which Political Leader Would Make the Best Prime Minister? (Choose 1 or 2)


FIGURE 5. Which Should Be the Government's Top Action Priorities?

Key:

- (1) Terrorism
- (2) Pensions
- (3) Housing
- (4) Prices
- (5) Health Care
- (6) Unemployment
- (7) Drugs

- (A) January 1981
- (B) June 1981
- (C) October 1981
- (D) March 1982

Bottom line: Responses in percentage points.





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## National Institutions

Respondents generally were more tight-fisted than in the past when asked to name the national institutions that do the best job in furthering the general well-being (Figure 6). Not all respondents took advantage of the option offered them of naming two preferences, and 17.7 percent declined to answer at all. That said, most respondents continued to approve of the presidency as an institution, and thus, even though its approval rating slipped from 29.3 to 25.3 percent, it came out on top, followed by the Church (down from 26.8 to 25.1 percent) and the independent press, which lost its first-place standing and tumbled from 33.5 to 23.7 percent. It should be admitted, though, that opinion of the press has always had its ups and downs. The press is still seen in a better light in central Italy and in the South (37.3 and 27.7 percent, respectively), in big cities (42.6 percent), by white-collar workers and executives (34.8 and 43.3 percent) and, oddly enough, by the unemployed (42.1 percent).

Respondents continue to look with increasing favor upon the courts (up from 15.4 to 17.4 percent), while the police and carabinieri are right up there with 16.8 percent approval. Confirmed again is public diffidence vis-a-vis the political forces: approval of political parties is down from 11.2 to 9.6 percent, while the labor organizations have fallen from 18.1 to 15.4 percent in the public confidence. The youngest of us, though, still have hopes for politics: 23 percent of them place the party in second place among sound institutions -- right behind the press and ahead of the Church.

## The DC Was Never So Clean

The DC is among the parties doing the best job at rooting out scandal. That statement may raise an eyebrow, but it is what emerges from answers to a specific question in the survey (see Fig. 7).

A year ago, it was the PCI that was perceived as most effective in combating scandals.


The same question propounded today reflects a changed political climate. The negative answers combined with the don't-knows are down to 46.3 percent. The PCI is still in first place with 23.1 percent, but the DC has bounced up to second place, with 15.7 percent, beating out even the PSI's 15.5 percent. The radicals dropped a bit (8.7 percent) edged out even by the republicans (9.6 percent). Analysis of the individual data shows that the DC's efforts to change its image for the better were a good move, winning support even among the very young voters (20 percent) and among their elders over 55 (22.7 percent). In the South and on the islands, Piccoli's party is right on top, with 20.4 percent.

The data on the PSI show marked disparities among parties and along class lines. The socialists' policy stand on the moral issue appeals strongly to executives and businessmen (23.7 percent).

FIGURE 6

Which of Our Institutions  
Does Most for the Country?

- (1) Political parties
- (2) The Church
- (3) The Presidency
- (4) The Courts
- (5) The Carabinieri
- (6) The Police
- (7) RAI (national radio/TV)
- (8) The independent press
- (9) Organized labor



NOTE: In each section of  
the graph:


Top bar refers to June 1980  
Bar 2 refers to June 1981  
Bar 3 refers to October 1981  
Bar 4 refers to March 1982

FIGURE 7. Which Political Parties Are Working Most Effectively  
To Root Out Corruption in Public Office? (Pick one or two)

RESPONSES in order, top to bottom:

- Christian Democrats (DC)
- Communists (PCI)
- Socialists (PSI)
- Republicans (PRI)
- Social Democrats (PSDI)
- Radicals (PR)
- Proletarian Unity (PDUP)
- Proletarian Democrats (DP)
- None of the above

NOTE: In each section of the graph,  
the top bar refers to the  
January 1981 survey, while  
the second refers to the  
March 1982 poll.



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TABLE 3. IS ANTICOMMUNIST PREJUDICE A THING OF THE PAST?

ANSWERS	YES	NO	DON'T UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION	DON'T KNOW
TOTAL	24.1	37.7	23.0	15.2
<u>SEX</u>				
Men	31.6	44.0	13.2	11.1
Women	16.3	31.3	33.0	19.4
<u>AGE</u>				
15-19	14.6	51.2	26.8	7.3
20-24	24.2	32.3	22.6	21.0
25-34	31.4	41.0	19.0	8.6
35-44	28.7	35.0	20.0	16.2
45-55	21.6	32.4	25.7	20.3
Over 55	18.2	38.4	26.3	17.2
<u>GEOGRAPHICAL AREA</u>				
Northwest	18.7	44.4	25.6	10.3
Northeast	19.0	34.9	26.7	18.6
Center	28.0	26.7	25.3	20.0
South and Islands	27.3	39.3	18.6	14.8
<u>TOWNS AND CITIES</u>				
Under 21,400	21.4	39.8	28.2	10.7
Over 500,000	28.8	44.1	10.2	16.9
<u>OCCUPATION</u>				
Housewife	12.2	25.7	37.8	24.3
Student	22.2	48.1	18.5	11.1
Professional/Executive	40.6	56.3	--	3.1
Craftsman/Tradesman	30.6	40.8	18.4	10.2
Farm worker	18.9	28.4	32.4	20.3
White-collar worker	35.6	42.5	12.6	9.2
Retiree	16.4	37.0	28.8	17.8
Unemployed	27.8	33.3	16.7	22.2

TABLE 1. Which Party (or Mix of Parties) Do You Think Would Do Best at Solving the Nation's Problems?

The one we have	12.6	DC-lay parties (no PCI) with PSI prime minister	4.8
All-DC	6.9	DC-PSI-PRI	2.5
DC-PCI with others	4.6	Government with no DC	7.2
DC-lay parties + PCI, with DC prime minister	2.3	Technocrat government	9.9
DC-lay parties + PCI with PSI prime minister	5.7	Leftist government	13.9
DC-lay parties (no PCI) with DC prime minister	3.2	Other	8.7
		Don't know	17.7

TABLE 2. Which Party Do You Feel Closest to Your Own Opinions?

PARTY	ELECTIONS 1979	MAY 1980	JANUARY 1981	MAY 1981	OCTOBER 1981	MARCH 1982
DC	33.9	32.3	31.5	31.6	25.8	30.8
PCI	19.6	26.9	24.9	24.1	24.2	19.0
PSI	16.8	16.9	16.7	19.7	22.1	22.8
PRI	4.9	3.5	4.7	5.8	8.2	6.6
PSDI	2.1	4.0	2.1	3.4	2.5	2.6
PLI	3.5	3.7	6.6	2.7	2.9	3.2
MSI	4.6	3.8	4.6	3.3	2.9	4.9
PDUP	1.2	2.1	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.3
PR	3.0	4.2	5.1	3.8	4.1	3.0
DP	3.9	1.1	1.0	4.5	4.5	3.0
OTHERS	6.5	1.6	1.5	--	1.2	2.8
UNDECIDED (no answer or no party choice)	42.9	24.2	24.1	35.6	43.0	46.4
	0	10	20	30	40	50

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TABLE 4. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE PERFORMANCE  
OF THE PARTY YOU VOTED FOR?

	Jan 81	Jun 81	Oct 81	Mar 82
Lived up to my expectations	24.9	16.4	17.2	10.9
Did not behave as I thought it would	12.0	11.5	8.7	12.9
Did some things right and some things wrong	26.2	30.0	31.7	22.9
Did such a poor job that I would never vote for it again.	3.4	4.3	4.4	6.2
Did the best it could	21.6	25.9	28.0	27.7
Don't know	12.0	11.9	10.1	11.3

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POLITICAL

ITALY

USSR SEEN TRYING TO REGAIN PCI 'SOLIDARITY'

PM171301 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 16 May 82 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "Moscow's Penitents"]

[Text] Moscow is asked [PCI Secretary General] Berlinguer for a truce. This can be inferred from statements by Moscow representatives reported in Western newspapers and from the interpretations given by the Kremlin to the leaders of various communist parties. It can also be deduced from the Leningrad delegation's unexpected visit to the PCI's Milan Federation. In all these cases the Soviets have tried to diminish the importance of the conflict with the Italian party. Their arguments run something like this: Berlinguer was wrong, but the PCI remains a major fraternal party, important in the joint strategy, and therefore the CPSU does not want to pursue the polemic and the only thing that it will be unable to tolerate from now on will be any further attempts to denigrate the socialist countries. Berlinguer probably did not reckon on such an outcome when he questioned the socialist character of the regimes created in the eastern bloc. Perhaps his challenge was not designed to cause an outright rupture, but the challenge itself undoubtedly took into account the possibility of a rupture. It could not have been otherwise.

On all similar and previous occasions the Soviets have reacted to a challenge with a rupture. With Tito and Mao they used excommunication, subsequently insisting that all parties honor the condemnation of the excommunicates. For whole decades no communist conference or congress was held without pronouncements first against Tito, then against Mao. Berlinguer expressed opinions no less sacrilegious than those of the Yugoslav or Chinese leaders. Indeed, his criticism of the distortion of the October ideals was in some respects more far-reaching. It was part of Soviet-Communist logic that he should be labeled a heretic. Now, instead of the excommunication, the Kremlin is making a reappraisal (perhaps partly because it is still not clear whether Berlinguer's sudden swing is a tactical device or a strategic choice of camp).

Is Moscow changing style or losing strength? It is probably a case of both together. When a power declines it is obliged to change its approach. The Kremlin leaders succeeded in keeping the hostile front of the so-called world communist movement united against Tito and Mao. The condemnation of the Titoist and Maoist revisionists and renegades was virtually "monolithic."

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However, the Kremlin has lost both those contests. It became apparent that an autonomous form of communism could survive without--and even against--Moscow. Krushchev was forced to recognize this with regard to Tito. Brezhnev is moving toward the same recognition with regard to Mao's heirs.

With Berlinguer, a conflict exacerbated to the extent of an excommunication would have had the same outcome. Moscow would have had to acknowledge for the third time its inability to reassert its authority over a breakaway party. It has already been seen that the use of "dummy" parties [partiti "talpa"] is not very productive.

Having discerned no foreseeable benefit from an excommunication, the Politburo decided it would be more useful to attenuate the conflict. It is not simply a case of the Soviets abandoning their reprisals against Berlinguer. The necessity above all is to halt Berlinguer. Never before in the international context has the cacuity of the Kremlin's ideological formulas appeared so tangible; never before has the discrepancy between real needs and theoretical plans been so plain; never before has Moscow had so few answers to so many growing questions; and never before has the artificiality of the Soviet system been so close to absurdity as it is now.

Berlinguer has raised all these issues. They are so real and so burning that Brezhnev can no longer even label their spokesman as a heretic. But neither can he discuss them openly. A debate would lay bare even more of the flaws of the pachyderm that is now as much a burden on itself as it is on others. Therefore an attempt is being made to nullify the polemic, to persuade Berlinguer, within the context of a woolly [ovattata] internationalist solidarity, to abandon his extraordinary opinions about the nature of Eastern-bloc regimes, from which he may gain nothing, whereas Moscow has everything to lose. [First deputy chief of CPSU international department] Zagladin issues the following advice to him in LA REPUBBLICA: He would do better to combat the deployment of new missiles in Italy.

In the Kremlin there has been a reappraisal not only in determining the tactic for absorbing the new revisionist. There has also been some reappraisal of the substantive issues raised by Berlinguer's critical assessment. This is reflected in the implications of Andropov's complex report to the academy [as published] on Lenin's birthday. Two things were said for the first time in that speech: First, that pluralism can be admissible even in a socialist regime; and second, that the Soviet model must not be applied or applicable in other countries.

It is difficult to tell whether this departure from ideological dogmatism was facilitated by Suslov's death. Had he heard it, Suslov would certainly have died a second death. Be that as it may, no politburo member has ever ventured so far. Furthermore, the man concerned is head of the KGB, the security committee. It is true that Andropov introduced the new concepts into theoretical outlooks partly to limit their scope. In fact, with regard to pluralism, he added that "since there are no antagonistic classes" within socialism "no organized opposition can ever emerge."

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Along the same line, while insisting that every country must implement its own forms of socialism without following the Soviet model, he warned that there are still "general laws," nonobservance of which leads to vague fantasies about the substance of socialism." Despite the restrictive interpretations, the fact still remains that Berlinguer's spectacular challenge inserted a gnawing doubt into the immovable certainties of the Moscow ideologists. At one time it was inconceivable, except to be categorically refuted.

From these aspects, Berlinguer has managed to win his challenge to Moscow, at least for the time being. He has prompted the Kremlin leaders to make more substantial reappraisals than the Soviets have managed to inculcate in the PCI. However, Berlinguer could begin to lose his challenge if he allowed himself to become involved in the maneuver to nullify the conflict--whether by following Zagladin's advice to abandon the polemic in the supreme interests of socialism or by backtracking in the face of this warning from Andropov: "We will repel attempts to denigrate the experiences of the peoples that have taken the path to socialism." Moscow seems to have discovered many reasons for silencing the PCI--the same ones that should persuade Berlinguer to continue talking and challenging.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRIEFS

NEW MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF--Hansgeorg Model, 55, brigadier general in Hamburg, will become director of the secret service "Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr" [Armed Forces Information Services Agency] in Bad Neuenahr. Under the direction of Model, a son of Field Marshal Walter Model of the former Wehrmacht, about 500 military experts will, in the former "Ahrblick" sanatorium, collect and analyze intelligence data concerning actions and plans of the Warsaw Pact and the armed forces of so-called Third World countries. The Ministry of Defense expects Model to furnish "responsible assessments of the situation." In this manner, the defense ministry's strategists hope to become more independent of the intelligence reports of the Federal Intelligence Service in Pullach, which are more oriented toward foreign policy rather than military matters. [Text] [Hamburg STERN in German 29 Apr 82 p 298]  
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MILITARY

FRANCE

MAINTAINING SNLE'S PART OF PEACETIME NAVY MISSION

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Apr 82 pp 36-37

[Article by Rear Admiral Alain Duthoit: "The Operational Support of Forces"]

[Text] The operations connected with national deterrence represent two-thirds of the activity of the maritime forces of the second region. They are organized and led by the maritime prefect who is commander-in-chief for the Atlantic.

Some 15 years, the assignments of the maritime prefects were modified. Previously, their mission was often the operational and logistic support of forces.

In effect, France at that time did not really have its own strategy, because of its membership in the integrated NATO organization. The naval forces' activity was devoted exclusively to training and services. No purely national operation was envisioned, or any peacetime operation.

Real Operations on an Ongoing Basis

Strategic nuclear weaponry changed all that. Since the assertion of the strategy of deterrence and the withdrawal from the integrated organization of NATO, the Navy has received important national missions to be carried out in peacetime. The first of these missions is the deployment of the missile-launching nuclear submarines (SNLE's), whose home port is Brest. The maritime prefect of the second region is responsible for ensuring the security of the SNLE's at the time of their departure and their reentry into port, and in a more general way, is responsible for organizing and carrying out the operations of support for the SNLE's. In parallel, the strategy of deterrence has required a clearer assertion of national sovereignty in the maritime zones of priority interest to France--that is, roughly speaking, the approaches to the national territory. Since deterrence is exercised every day, operations of alert, tracking of intruders and surveillance that make it possible to know what is happening off the borders of the national territory and to prevent, as the case may require, French interests from being disputed or threatened, must be conducted on a permanent basis.

Today, nearly two-thirds of the activity of the forces of the second maritime region are devoted to these real operations:

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--the security and support of the SNLE's;  
--maritime and aerial surveillance of the approaches;  
--monitoring of commercial navigation;  
--rescue at sea.

That is why the maritime prefect has been given operational command of the entirety of the forces that participate in these operations.

**A Very Vast Theater of Operations**

In time of crisis and on the order of the government, the maritime prefect of the second region would take on the functions of "commander-in-chief for the Atlantic" (CECLANT). But in peacetime, it is advisable to prepare for such an eventuality by establishing the appropriate plans and organizing close cooperation with the commanders of the nearby maritime zones and with the maritime commands of the allied countries and of NATO.

Thus it is that PREMAR II<sup>1</sup> maintains close relations with PREMAR I<sup>1</sup> (Cherbourg) (zone 1), with COMAR-Dakar<sup>2</sup> (zone 9), with COMAR-Fort-de-France (zone 8), all of whom would come under the command of CECLANT in time of crisis.

Likewise, close cooperation is maintained with the allied commander-in-chief for the Atlantic (SACLANT, in Norfolk) and the allied commander-in-chief for the Channel (CINCHAN, in Northwood), as well as with the navies of friendly and neighboring countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, Spain and Portugal.

**A Constantly Manned Center of Maritime Operations**

All the operations that come under PREMAR II are programmed, organized, coordinated and carried out by the Center of Maritime Operations (COM-Brest). Constantly manned by officers and petty officers of all competences (surface, submarine, aeronautical, meteorological, signaling), COM-Brest has all the means necessary for directing sea operations, involving defensive operations, major exercises, or public-service operations (monitoring of fishing and commercial navigation, combating pollution, etc). It has facilities for liaison with vessels and aircraft at sea, but also with all the organisms, civilian or military, French or foreign, that may be led to cooperate with it.

The permanent functioning of this command instrument for preparing and conducting real operations at all times with forces that are entirely available is the best guarantee of PREMAR II's capacity to take on without difficulty, in the event of serious crisis, the functions of commander-in-chief for the Atlantic.

Rear Admiral Alain Duthoit, who entered the Naval Academy in 1948, took part in the Indochina operations from 1951 to 1953. Qualified in signaling and certified by the ESGN [Advanced School of Naval Warfare], and having taken courses in the

1. PREMAR II: maritime prefect of the 2nd region  
PREMAR I: maritime prefect of the 1st region
2. COMAR-Dakar: commander of the Navy at Dakar

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CHEM [Center for Advanced Metal Studies] and in the IHEDN [Institute for Higher National Defense Studies], he has commanded the "Cham-penois," the "Aconit" and the "Duquesne." He has taught at the Higher School of Naval Warfare (1968-1971). He is currently "operations" assistant to CECLANT.

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